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THE CODE OF HONOR IN WESTERN CULTURE 
Thomas J. Steele, S.J. 
Regis University, Denver 
This paper intends to present a brief overview of the 
honor code and its sociocultural context, and its purpose is 
to alert the reader to the sort of world in which 
considerations of honor are an important indeed, an 
omnipresent -- factor. It is impossible to define the honor 
code in simple terms because, through the history of world 
culture in general and western culture in particular, it has 
coexisted with various social systems which themselves may 
either be independent or survive as parts of larger systems 
(like the peasantry within a kingdom or a modern national 
state); and these different contexts have transformed honor 
into a multitude of different shapes. The honor code first 
appeared as a feature of tribal peoples; it was, for instance, 
part of the traditional Plains Indian complex of culture 
traits, perhaps most spectacularly in the coup stick. Honor 
survived from the primitive period of Europe through the 
classical period both among the peoples of rural regions and 
even of cities, and with the aid of the Germanic tribal 
influx, it came to characterize the medieval era. With the 
end of the middle ages, it received a rebirth with the revival 
of classicism, outlasted the renaissance, and endured into the 
romantic centuries. When a new post-romantic cultural era 
begins (and it has almost certainly begun already), the honor 
1 
code will probably find a both new relationship to it and new 
host groups -- probably not dominant but recidivist such as 
those that can be characterized as honor cultures during the 
last few centuries: aristocrats, peasants, adolescents, and 
the military. 1 
The honor code is most easily decribed as it might exist 
in a small, simple, static, traditional society; by contrast, 
a large, complex, developing, changing society needs a widely 
and deeply researched and carefully nuanced presentation for 
each distinct area and for each period of a century or less. 
For the honor code is part of an ensemble of interpersonal 
relationships (shared agreements, received meanings) which 
form a pervasive communal background among people who are 
raised in it and continue to adhere to it. Although this 
cultural syndrome has survived in different cultural and 
economic worlds, its typical characteristics and its "type" 
incarnation, for our purposes, came during the European middle 
ages and early Renaissance as the carefully constructed 
appearance by which white, wealth, well-born males displayed 
their plumage. It is from this era that the honor code has 
come to impinge upon the subject now under discussion; the 
medieval synthesis was a paradigmatic past, and consequently 
1 Peter L. Berger, The Homeless Mind (New York: Random 
House, 1973), pp. 83, 84, and 86, names off "military officers or 
ethnic grandmothers"; the "hopelessly European 11 or the victim of "a 
'provincial mentality'"; and "the nobility, the military, and 
traditional professions like law and medicine ... In traditional New 
Mexico, however, lawyers were considered utterly dishonorable. 
2 
it has been constitutive of the present. The six traits we 
will examine are these: orality, relative lack of historical 
awareness, territoriality and agriculture, hierarchical 
social structure, communality, and opinion and glory. 
Orality 
la A group is characteristically oral if the basic wisdom by 
which it lives is "contained" in the group memory and becomes 
actual only when it is recited or recollected (usually aloud 
and in public) . As Walter Ong describes it for the wholly 
preliterate: 
The psyche in a culture innocent of writing knows by a 
kind of empathetic identification of knower and known, in 
which the object of knowledge and the total being of the 
knower enter into a kind of fusion, in a way which 
literate cultures would typically find unsatisfyingly 
vague and garbled and somehow too intense and 
participatory. To personalities shaped by literacy, oral 
folk often appear curiously unprogramed, not set off 
against their physical environment, unresponsive to 
abstract demands such as a "job" that entails commitment 
to routines organized in accordance with abstract clock 
time (as against human, or lived, "felt," duration) .... 
Oral cultures appropriate actuality in recurrent, 
formulaic agglomerates, communally generated and shared. 2 
Or as Berkeley Peabody has phrased the same sort of thing, 
Traditional singers produce songs. These songs are 
not about anything, since their "thought" does not exist 
as an entity organized separately from the songs 
themselves. The wisdom of an oral tradition, 
therefore, must be regarded as inherent and integral with 
the practice of the tradition itself, not localized 
2 Walter J. Ong, S. J. , Interfaces of the Word 
Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 18-19. 
3 
(Ithaca: 
elsewhere. 3 
Therefore the oral culture tends to have an abiding dislike 
and distrust of the truly original; it is only what is 
compatible with the known that comforts and reassures -- "What 
oft was thought but ne'er so well express'd," what unavoidably 
follows from what is known, what fits the patterns of the 
received wisdom. 
1b A characteristically oral culture, even if it knows about 
writing, will tend to place paramount value on the pledged 
word the promise or the oath. One's honor almost 
altogether rests upon his word, so that to belie a promise is 
to cast one's very raison d'etre into doubt. 4 Paradoxically 
(it seems to us), "A man commits his honour only through his 
sincere intentions," says Julian Pitt-Rivers. "It is lack of 
steadfastness in intention that is dishonouring, not 
misrepresentations of them"; and consequently a well-wrought 
lie told to an outsider can even increase a man's standing 
with his in-group -- and before the gods, who "have nothing 
3 Berkeley Peabody, The Winged Word (Albany: SUNY Press, 
1975), p. 168. 
Some familiar stories are the Jephthah episode in Judges 
11:29-40, the Herod-Salome episode in Mark 6:14-19, and Chaucer's 
"Franklin's Tale" in The Canterbury Tales. Carl D. Schneider, 
Shame. Exposure and Privacy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1977), pp. 
113-17, comments helpfully on shame in the Bible, and F.S.C. 
Northrop, Man. Nature. and God (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1962), p. 124, draws the contrast between "law of status" and "law 
of contract." See also Sidney Painter, French Chivalry (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1957), pp. 29-30; Aaron Gurevich, 
Historical Anthrqpology of the Middle Ages (Chicago: University Of 
Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 138, 150. 
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against straight-forward lying, but they do object to their 
names being taken in vain." 5 
1c The actual "practice" of the honor code often became 
public by means of oral expression in a communal setting. 
Epic poems narrate the boasting and flyting of heroes. 6 Many 
oral cultures make much of proverbs or riddles, the latter of 
which have to be answered in a sort of wit-combat like the 
medieval university's disputation or its contemporary 
survival, the dissertation defense. Oral poetry sometimes 
took the form of a contest, as we find in Virgil's Eclogue 
5 Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind {New York: Harper, 
1960), pp. 165-66; Julian Pitt-Rivers, "Honour and Social Status," 
in J.C. Peristiany, ed., Honour and Shame {London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1965) , p. 32, noting the King of Aragon's boast of 
having deceived the King of France nine times; E.R. Dodds, The 
Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1966), p. 32. 
Elsie Clews Parsons, Taos Pueblo (Menasha: American 
Anthropological Association, 1936), p. 71: "Anciently, stealing 
from other tribes or from Mexicans gave a man distinction"; Bertram 
Wyatt-Brown, Honor and Violence in the Old South {New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), p. 23, quotes an 1853 scholar, "In what 
does this Janus-faced honour consist? It is not honesty; for 
nothing is more common, both here and in Europe, than for men of 
honour to contract debts without intending to pay them. Nor can it 
be veracity, for the falsehoods of gallantry ... or diplomacy are 
sometimes matters of triumph with honourable men." See also pp. 
137-38. 
6 Dodds, p. 30, speaks of the archaic {post-Homeric, pre-
classical) "notion that too much success incurs a supernatural 
danger, especially if one brags about it .... It is plain, however, 
from the uninhibited boasting in which Homeric man indulges that he 
does not take the danger of phthonos [divine resentment] very 
seriously; such scruples are foreign to a shame-culture." See also 
K. J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and 
Aristotle {Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 
234-35; Gurevich, p. 167; and Robert Kaster, "The Shame of the 
Romans," Transactions of the American Philological Association 127 
(1997) 1 13-14 • 
5 
VII, in the Germanic Meistersinger, in the French or Italian 
troubadour or trovatore, or in the Mexican or New Mexican 
trove. And as noted above, even the well-told lie can be 
something to boast of -- or the convincing tall tale, like the 
Virginian's account to Trampas of frog-ranching in California. 
ld Finally, when an oral culture knows of writing, it 
depreciates it by insisting that there be some bodily-
performed supplement to any transaction involving a written 
document. Thus the immixtio manuum, the mingling of hands, 
was a necessary part of the lord-vassal relationship in the 
medieval period. The vassal would place his hands palm to 
palm within the lord's hands, and they would swear to their 
relationship; an illustration from the early fourteenth 
century shows the vassal with five hands; with two he points 
to the stalks of grain on the fields he receives, with one he 
points to himself, with two he performs the imroixtio manuum. 
The kiss was another part of the ceremony. Yet another part 
of the complex act of possession might require the vassal to 
visit the fief and actually take clods, crops, or stones into 
his hands and throw them about. 7 
7 F.L. Ganshof, Feudalism (London: Longmans, Green,1952), 
frontispiece, pp. 64-66, 71-72. The immixtio manuum is the model 
of how we modern Christians of the European tradition fold our 
hands when we pray, imagining that we are the vassals of the 
heavenly Lord and that He reaches down from above to take our hands 
in his as we kneel before him. See also Ganshof, pp. 111-12; John 
Frederick Schwaller, Church and Clergy in Nineteenth-CentuhY Mexico 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1987), p. 87; Brian 
Stock, The Implications of Literacy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1983), pp. 50-51; William A. Keleher, 11 The Law of 
the New Mexico Land Grant, 11 New Mexico Historical Review 4 (1929), 
6 
Incomplete Awareness of History 
2a The first three periods of our culture, the primal, the 
classical, and the medieval, were incompletely historical 
because they did not become reflexively aware of themselves 
(self-critical) nor did they possess a sense of the 
differences between their own ancestors and themselves. From 
the grasp of the variety of the past and from the conscious 
choice of classical over medieval came the Renaissance; from 
the choice of medieval over classical came Romanticism; from 
the choice of primal over medieval and classical could come 
yet another cultural era. But prior to the Renaissance, if 
history as such could be perceived at all, it appeared simply 
as an evil because anything that rendered this year different 
from last threatened to change "the way it's always been." 8 
It's always been the way it•s always been because at the 
beginning time the gods or the culture hero established the 
patterns of all meaningful activities. They or he or she then 
permitted or even solicited the entire range of incidental 
troubles in order to provide an entire range of remedies. 9 
354; Marc Bloch, Feudal Society {Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1961), p. 88; Aaron Gurevich, Categories of Medieval Culture 
{London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), pp. 77-78. 
8 Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return {Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1954), pp. 34-35, 75. 
9 Berard Haile, O.F.M., Legend of the Ghostway Ritual in the 
Male Branch of Shootingway {St. Michaels: St. Michael's Press, 
1950), pp. 153-54; Katherine Spencer, Mythology and Values: An 
Analysis of Nayaho Chantway Myths {Philadelphia: American Folklore 
Society, 1957), p. 211; John Ladd, The Structure of a Moral Code 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957). 
7 
Anything new is therefore troubling, and the people of an 
oral-traditional culture will tend to "understand" it into 
some familiar category and thereby negate all the newness. 
Thus the people perceived Jesus as "John the Baptist or Elijah 
or Jeremiah or one of the other prophets," while the Twelve 
perceived him as the Christ; but nobody could grasp him as God 
incarnate until a lot of the old categories and patterns were 
destroyed and Jesus' era was accepted as a new pattern-setting 
time. 
But old patterns continue to assert themselves, for once 
a document has been put into effect, it becomes a paradigm for 
all the future. The document need not be present in its own 
being because its effects remain present, and so the document 
itself can appear to be less an effect-brought-about-in-
continuing-time and more a cause-existing-in-exemplary-time 
with an effect in historical time. 
2b The less historical-minded person or cultural era will 
tend to value space and land more than a more historical-
minded person or era; the former will tend to be space-
primary, believing that the gods primarily put man into a 
sacred place and that the sacredness of time derives from that 
of space. 
2c The static mind of the unhistorical person or era will 
tend to fasten on the static two of the four Aristotelian 
causes (formal and final-exemplary) and the more dynamic minds 
of the historicist person or era will tend to fasten on the 
8 
efficient and material causes. Therefore the earlier type is 
given to synchronic pattern-thinking, whereas our era takes to 
diachronic scientific-philosophical thinking: we say that A 
causes B (which therefore follows A in time) because A does 
something to the material out of which B comes to be composed. 
Therefore also the later reasoning tends toward genuine 
mathematics, whereas the earlier discovers ever-proliferating 
sets of "magic" numbers three, four (directions, 
evangelists, animals in Ezekiel, elements, humors) , seven 
(sacraments, weekdays, visible planets, known metals, branches 
on candlestick, capital sins, gifts of the Holy Spirit), 
twelve, twenty-eight ... perhaps straggling all the way to the 
notorious six hundred and sixty-six of Revelations. 10 
Territoriality and Agriculture 
3a Some feudal relationships did not involve land held in 
fealty, but the feudal system as an entirety and the honor 
code along with it were nevertheless solidly and fundamentally 
based on agricultural land. 11 
3b All the people of the society took their names from land, 
running down from the royal top (King of England, King of 
10 Berger, p. 91, says, "In a world of honor, identity is 
firmly linked to the past through the reiterated performance of 
prototypical [archetypal, we would say] acts." 
11 Ganshof, pp. 63, 87-88; Gurevich, Categories, pp. 45-46, 
54-57; Gurevich, Historical Anthropology, pp. 207-08; Douglas Kent 
Hall, New Mexico; Voices in an AnCient Landscape {New York: Henry 
Holt, 1995), pp. 60, 68. 
9 
France; Prince of Wales) through the nobility {Earl of Devon, 
Duke of Bedford) and the landed gentry, and down to the lower 
classes who took their descriptive name from the ~ -- the 
peasants. All these people were joined into a single 
socio-economic system of the agricultural-military type -- for 
much of the mutual obligation of lord and vassal had to do 
with military assistance in times of need, for the peasants 
worked to keep an armored knight on horseback with his feet in 
the stirrups. 12 
3c The village was the most important component in the 
peasants' lives, more dominant than penitential Brotherhood, 
nuclear family, job, and so forth. 13 
3d In between the upper class of royalty and nobles and the 
lower class of peasants, the middle class of commercial and 
industrial interests had not yet inserted themselves. The 
honor code is pre-commercial and pre-industrial, and therefore 
it is pre-urban. Its roots are in the land, especially 
ancestral land, as in the case of Naboth the Jezreelite and 
the hereditary vineyard Ahab and Jezebel set their hearts upon 
{1 Kings 21) . Ahab and his forebears, just by being kings, 
12 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media {New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 179. See also Paul Kutsche and John Van 
Ness, Canones {Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1981), 
p. 45; Hall, p. 60. 
13 Thomas J. Steele, S.J., and Rowena A. Rivera, Penitente 
Self-Government {Santa Fe: Ancient City Press, 1985), p. 11n16, 
with several references; Steele, Santos and Saints: The Religious 
Folk Art of Hispanic New Mexico {Santa Fe: Ancient City Press, 
1994), pp. 104-08, 114-15. 
10 
had gathered a capital city around themselves and thereby 
started the calculus of history which would bring kingship to 
an end; and Ahab already looked upon land (someone else • s 
land, at least) as a mere commodity. For Naboth, by contrast, 
ancestral land retained its sacral character. It had been 
rendered holy by the exemplary beginning-time ancestral 
possession, indeed, but in Naboth•s own day it constituted as 
a space sacred to the family that pertained to it. There may 
be some very analogous honor-code territoriality in youth-gang 
11 turf 11 in our large cities today, though these teen-age boys 
and girls would hardly verbalize their spatial rights and 
duties in terms of holiness or fealty. 
Hierarchical Social Structure [prudence] 14 
4a In the section following this, we will see that the 
social order established on this agricultural land-base is 
highly communal; here we will examine its hierarchical, its 
14 As Curtis Brown Watson points out in Shakespeare and the 
Renaissance Concept of Honor (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1960), pp. 111-12, the honor code fits quite well with the 
four cardinal virtues of Aristotle, prudence, justice, temperance, 
and fortitude. These will be noted in italics in parts four and 
six. See Watson, p. 229; Dover, p. 66. Hans Speier, Social Order 
and the Risks of War (New York: George W. Stewart, 1952), p. 43, 
cites various earlier scholars on the same point but sorts out 
virtues and their applications differently than I do -- putting 
magnanimity under fortitude rather than under (distributive) 
justice, for instance. 
11 
pyramidal, character. 15 As the previous section noted, there 
is a king/greater-nobility/lesser-nobility/gentry/peasant-
serf/slave configuration, with one person on top, ninety 
percent of the people near the bottom, and the remaining ten 
percent serving as vassals to overlords and as lords at least 
to a handful of peasants. The parallel social structure, the 
church, had of course its own pyramidal shape, with the pope 
at the top, the laity at the bottom, and a network of bishops, 
abbots and abbesses, prioresses and priors, monsignori, 
priests, nuns, monks, friars, and other such minor clergy in 
the middle. At any rate, all the oral contracts (oaths of 
fealty, religious vows) which held each of these social 
structures together were agreements between unequals; there 
was no democracy here, the statement "All men are created 
equal" would have seemed a gross absurdity, and the king 
seemed really near to a near-God. 16 
15 Wilhelm Korff, "Honor Gives Way to ~restige," in Franz 
Bockle, ed. , Dilemmas of Tomorrow's World (New York: Paulist 
Press, 1969), pp. 120-21, describes medieval society as an 
authoritarian and class-structured system of fixed 
interrelationships in which one's birth was the main criterion of 
personal honor and one's outlook involved consideration of society 
as a whole; this system offered stability and socio-psychological 
security. See also J.E. Lendon, Empire of Honour: The Art of 
Government in the Roman World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 
58-59, and Lyman L. Johnson and Sonya Lipsett-Rivera, eds., The 
Faces of Honor: Sex. Shame. and Violence in Colonial Latin America 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998), pp. 28-30, 
63, 140. 
16 Watson, pp. 137, 186. See Richard II 5. 3.136, Hamlet 
4. 5.127-29: "There's such divinity doth hedge a king I That 
treason can but peep to what it would, I Acts little of his will." 
~ was first staged before James I; during the American 
Revolution, George Washington could not bring himself to speak of 
12 
4b As Kenneth Burke notes, the father-headed family was the 
key metaphor that the medieval period used to understand 
social order: 
From this metaphor there flowed the need of obedience to 
authority, as embodied in custom. In families one does 
not vote. Authority does not arise by deputation, as in 
parliamentary procedure -- it just is where it is, being 
grounded in the magic of custom. And family affections 
cannot find their exact quantitative equivalent in money. 
So like a father and his son, the superior and the inferior 
were both committed {but in radically different ways) to 
fulfilling the commitments in their part of the quasi-familial 
social order. 17 
4c The lord in a feudal relationship, even if he was in fact 
younger than his vassal, was known in Latin as senior 
{signiore, sieur, senor) . This terminology reflects the 
tendency for a society of this traditional sort to revere age 
as the repository of wisdom and authority and hence to 
attribute age to any authority figure. Respect for age and 
the things of age is a pillar of such a society; as Bruno 
Snell puts it, 11 It perpetuates the authority and the 
hierarchic order of an earlier society whose venerable customs 
11 the King's troops, 11 calling them always 11 the ministerial 
soldiers ... 
Wyatt-Brown, p. ix, comments accurately, 11 No slaveholding 
culture could casually set aside the strictures of honor. The very 
debasement of the slave added much to the master's honor, since the 
latter's claim to self-sufficiency [control, we have called it] 
rested upon the prestige, power, and wealth that accrued from the 
benefits of controlling others .... From the start [of the American 
South], slavery and honor were mutually dependent. 11 
17 Kenneth Burke, Attitudes Toward History {Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1961), p. 129; Ganshof, pp. 76-77, 85-87. 
13 
were regarded as sacred, as a work of the gods. 1118 An inferior 
in age or status would advance his own opinion, if at all, in 
a most deferential manner, terrified at the ridicule he might 
call down on himself: who is he to question what the men in 
authority have always said, to want to do something in any way 
but the way it's always been done? In such a society, the 
elders hold a place of preeminence difficult for our culture 
to conceive; in New Mexico alone of all the places where he 
has studied children, Robert Coles found it necessary to study 
the elderly and write The Old Ones; in Nigeria during the 
Biafran rebellion, while the children were starving, the 
elderly repositories of the tribal wisdom were not, for if the 
wisdom perishes the children have nothing to live for. 19 
4d The vassal or peasant owed his lord respect, obedience, 
and service (which normally included some tribute and either 
fighting or work) . The magnanimous lord' s obligations --
noblesse oblige -- included the protection of his subjects, 
advice and leadership, exemplary living, and Christianization 
in circumstances where the subjects were newly conquered (as 
New Mexican Pueblo Indians) . He should exercise distributive 
18 Ganshof, p. 63; Snell, p. 168; Hall, p. 60; Dover, pp. 
104-06. 
19 Watson, pp. 374-76. Charles L. Briggs, Competence in 
Performance: The Creativity of Tradition in Mexicano Verbal Art 
{Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988), studies 
11 la pl4tica de los viejitos -- the talking of the elders 11 as they 
communicate traditional values within the village context of 
Northern New Mexico. 
14 
justice by displaying a certain splendor of house, clothing, 
and retinue and by giving generous gifts when appropriate. 20 
4e The lord was often called to deeds of fortitude, which 
might include not only physical courage but also a dogged 
endurance in surviving adversity so as eventually to conquer 
and destroy the foe. 21 
4f Further, in the honor-code societies of which we are 
speaking here, the primacy is always held by a man. The 
social order is not only patrilocal and patrilineal, it is 
also very patriarchal. The reason for this arrangement may 
rest in the agricultural base, once it has advanced beyond the 
digging-stick and isolated-village stage of early 
agriculturalism. True peasants, those who use draft animals 
20 Charles Ross, Edward IV {Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1974), p. 257. In Shakespeare, a king without a 
retinue is no king at all; when Richard III enters alone and offers 
to trade his kingdom for a horse, only a fool would accept the 
offer. See also Maurice McNamee, S.J., Honor and the Epic Hero 
{New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. xii; Painter, pp. 
30-32, 79, 84, and 167-69; Dover, pp. 175-80; Gurevich, Historical 
Anthropology, pp. 178-87; Lendon, pp. 63-72, 149-54, 260-61; 
Johnson and Lipsett-Rivera, pp. 22-23, 30-35, 92. 
21 Watson, pp. 313-18, 324-26, 345. On the link between 
physical violence and honor, see Wyatt-Brown, p. 14. Moral courage 
tends to elevate the discussion above the honor-code level 
{Lawrence Kohlberg' s third stage in the development of moral 
reasoning) into the law-'n'-order level {Kohlberg's fourth-stage) 
or even -- if it includes non-violence -- the spiritual level 
{fifth- or sixth-stage) . 
Watson, p. 335, helpfully distinguishes between three meanings 
of the word "pride": that which is inherent in megalopsychia, the 
totally positive self-image of the good and heroic "great-souled" 
aristocrat {Kohlberg's third stage); unjustified self-esteem in 
Aristotelian ethics {fourth-stage) ; and the Christian capital sin 
{fifth-stage or beyond) . See also Dover, pp. 161-62, for the 
militaristic emphasis of tribal, classical, and feudal societies. 
15 
and live in villages that pertain to a nearby market town and 
to a king in his capital city, are always patriarchal, and the 
"greater society 11 which they support is patriarchal with them, 
on the level of family, of village, of region, of kingdom. 
Women have their own ways of getting their voices heard and 
their wills followed, but it is from beside the throne or 
behind the bedcurtains, for if it were known that the wife ran 
the cottage or the manor or the duchy or the kingdom, the 
husband's honor would be severely compromised if not 
altogether destroyed. In such a system, each woman pertains 
(practically speaking, belongs) to some man -- to her father 
or her husband; and so the father disposes of her in an 
arranged marriage. And the woman's honor is not merely her 
own but an honor her father or brother or husband or son must 
defend at all costs because it is identically his own. 22 
Communality 
Sa In this sort of society, the individual is not yet 
separated from the communal matrix, which overshadows his 
individuality. 23 
22 In earlier literature, non-arranged marriages tend to be 
deadly; see Romeo and Juliet and other love tragedies, perhaps 
especially The Duchess of Malfi. 
Facundo Valdez, "Verguenza," in Paul Kutsche, ed., The 
Survival of Spanish American Villages (Colorado Springs: Colorado 
College, 1979), p. 102. Chaucer's "Franklin's Tale" is a fine 
example here. 
23 Berger, p. 90, writes, "The concept of honor implies that 
identity is essentially, or at least importantly, linked to 
institutional roles ... To return to Falstaff's image [ 11 Honor is a 
16 
Sb Even more than family and far more than any job, it is 
the village that gives identity to the traditional person, and 
it is in terms of village respect and village survival that he 
will judge his success, not in terms of his individual 
attainments, his victories in competition, or his personal 
survival and reward after death. It is this land-and-people-
based commitment that even a modern democratic nation reverts 
to in time of major war, when it asks its young men to 
subordinate their individual wellbeing to the good of the 
group in defense of the territory. 
Sc It is within this village matrix that the individual has 
his security, not in what he personally possesses but in his 
entitlements as a member of the group. As B.H. Silcher van 
Bath says of the early medieval European farming villages, 
The duties and rights of these communities were based 
more on custom and oral tradition than on written rules, 
and everyone knew his obligations. In the little circle 
of relations and neighbors they were always ready to help 
one another in trouble and to share in the joy or sorrow 
at births, marriages, sickness, or death. The village 
community was entitled to judge minor causes and have its 
own weights and measures; it engaged the sexton and 
village herdsmen, supervised the roads, regulated the 
water supply, and so on. The farmers of the community 
were entitled to use the waste [outlying land, ejidos], 
or were in some cases [its] owners. The use of the woods 
mere ... scutcheon, 11 1 Henry 4 5 .1.140], in a world of honor the 
individual ia the social symbols emblazoned on his escutcheon. The 
true self of the knight is revealed as he rides out to do battle in 
the full regalia of his role. 11 See also Hall, pp. 60, 69; Kaster, 
pp. 9, 17; Gurevich, Categories, pp. 298-304. 
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and pastures was of great importance to farming. 24 
But beginning in the later middle ages -- or beginning shortly 
before Virgil's first Eclogue, we could say as well -- waves 
of enclosures began to pauperize the landless or smallholding 
but still entitled cottagers, the residents of cottages who 
had rights in the local commonland simply because they were 
resident in that neighborhood. The oral world fell apart for 
those people when literacy put another world together which 
excluded them, as Burke notes: 
The English "Statute of Frauds" ... celebrated the turn 
from status to contract (i.e., from unwritten custom to 
written legality) by holding that a man was not entitled 
to retain his property unless he could show a deed for 
it. Since the old feudal rights to the use of the 
11 lord's 11 acres had arisen purely by the authority of 
custom ... it followed that the very lineage of a right 
was grounds for its retraction. The longer it had 
prevailed, the less likely was there to be a written 
document attesting it. 25 
So much, therefore, for "the way it's always been. 11 And hence 
the Jack Cades of the early fifteenth century wanting to kill 
all the lawyers after the Black Death brought on the first 
wave of enclosures, and hence the instant urban proletariats 
when the enclosures of the eighteenth century completed the 
dismantling of the traditional world -- just in time to get 
the necessary legal machinery into the Common Law before the 
American Revolution -- and into the American Southwest after 
24 B.H. Silcher van Bath, The Agrarian History of Western 
Europe. 500-1850 (London: Edward Arnold, 1963), p. 158; R.H. 
Tawney, The Agrarian Problem in the Sixteenth Century (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 257-58; Briggs, pp. 30-39. 
25 Burke, p. 144. 
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the Mexican War. But for that matter, the eventual course of 
events might have been the same in the region without the 
American takeover, for as F.B. Pike points out, early 
nineteenth-century "liberals" -- economic liberals, that is to 
say, what we call free-market capitalists "sought to 
eliminate traditional compartments in society by suppressing 
the old subsidiary, corporative entities or organisms that 
stood between the government and citizens. Rather than the 
corporative or organic society, they aspired to the 
non-organic structuring of the body politic so that citizens 
might be liberated from unnecessary restraints in their 
individualistic pursuit of self-development. 1126 
Sd In certain of the earlier forms of this communality, 
moral reasoning is typically done at a pre-ethical level --
done apart from formal operations involving 
abstract-theoretical moral norms. There may be a large 
residue of concern for ritual impurity, which of course can 
occur despite the best of intentions. The Japanese shame 
culture of which Ruth Benedict wrote, like every shame 
culture, is extremely concerned about "gaucheries which are in 
no way sins. [A Japanese man] may be extremely chagrined 
about not dressing appropriately for the occasion or about a 
26 F.B. Pike, "Catholicism in Latin America," in Roger 
Aubert, ed., The Church in a Secularized Society (New York: Paulist 
Press, 1978), p. 325. 
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slip of the tongue. 1127 When by contrast the norms of an 
ethical code are available, as they are to any Christian 
peasant, he will still tend to live not in a guilt-culture 
manner but by his own pragmatic and earthy traditional norms. 
And as he has not yet learned the trick of being conscious of 
himself apart from his consciousness of the communal 
background, so he does not yet develop on his own a sense of 
personal immortality (though he may share a belief in 
immortality with the larger society of which his own 
subordinate society is an included part, as the Christian 
peasant certainly does) . 28 
Se Looked at according to the history of philosophy, the 
member of the communal honor culture took his stand on the 
earlier side of the Realism-Nominalism split. Realism saw the 
individual mainly as a member of the group, which possessed a 
paramount reality -- as primal archetype in illo tempore, in 
the Platonic world of ideas, in God's Augustinian mind, or (we 
might say today) in the Jungian archetypes. Nominalism, by 
contrast, sees the group -- species, society, whatever -- as 
27 Michael Gagarin, Aeschylean 
of California Press, 1976), pp. 
Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Boston: 
222; Paul Radin, Primitive Man As 
Appleton, 1927), pp. 49-51. 
Drama (Berkeley: University 
5-9; Ruth Benedict, The 
Houghton Mifflin, 1946), p. 
Philosopher (New York: D. 
28 Benedict, p. 224; Burke, p. 128, says, "Churchmen were 
admittedly not perfect, but the Church, as the earthly 
incorporation of the body of Christ, was perfect. Hence by 
membership in the church, one shared perfection vicariously, so 
that the incentive to 'justify' oneself by individual initiative 
('ambition' ) was sidetracked. " 
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nothing more than an aggregate of individuals; individuals are 
real, and common nouns (nomina) are merely mental counters 
used for convenience' sake. 29 
Opinion and Glory 
6a When I began studying Greek at age fifteen, I was bemused 
by the two English equivalents given for the word doxa: 
opinion and glory. The seeming illogicality continued with me 
for some years, since I never quite let go of Greek, but it 
has only been since my concern with the honor code that I have 
come to realize that glory is at its very center the opinion 
others have of one -- how one seems (dokei) to them. 30 And so 
in this one word the honor code sums itself up and 
manifests itself as the opposite of all that Plato strove and 
29 J. Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages (London: Edward 
Arnold, 1924), pp. 186-87, 195-97; Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of 
Literary Form (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1967), pp. 125-26; Harry R. Klecker, S.J., "Ockham and Efficient 
Causality," The Thomist 23 (1960), 107; Gurevich, Categories, pp. 
294, 307-08. 
30 Honor was a mutually-correcting dialectic balance of the 
individual aristocrat's positive self-image (which begged for 
public response) and the in-group's opinion (which rewarded the 
individual, often with an ad-hoc leader as spokesman). See also 
Werner Jaeger, Paideia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), 
pp. 8-13; Salvador de Madariaga, Englishmen. Frenchmen. Spaniards 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1929), pp. 7, 12; Dover, pp. 
226, 229; Painter, pp. 44-62. 
Korff, p. 118, defines honor as "the estimation of a man, 
formed and evidenced by other men on the basis of his merits. It 
is manifested objectively in his social status and subjectively in 
his personal estimation of his own worth." Wyatt-Brown, p. 15, 
describes it as "self-regarding in character. One's neighbors [in-
group, we might say] serve as mirrors that return the image of 
oneself." 
For shame, see Kaster, p. 4. 
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struggled for in his day. DQxa is all that stands opposed to 
the true knowledge (epistDme) which an individual ought to 
gain firsthand; ~ is all that stands opposed to the 
creation of a singular ethical agent discovering the good and 
performing it out of individual conviction, whatever the group 
says. The new Platonic man was the person in whom literacy 
had made its mark, prying him out of the communal background 
and pushing him off in the direction of personal immortality; 
it was at about the same time in Palestine that the graven Law 
brought the Jews to the same realization of personal survival 
after death. 31 
6b Temperance, one of Aristotle's four cardinal virtues, is 
not so much a cause of achieving honor as it is a condition of 
retaining it. If a person -- like Marc Antony in Antony and 
Cleopatra -- is in the grip of any addictive behavior, his or 
her behavior will destroy either the basis of honor or at 
least the appearance of it, as Hamlet makes clear: 
This heavy-headed revel east and west 
Makes us traduced and taxed of other nations. 
They clepe us drunkards, and with swinish phrase 
Soil our addition; and indeed it takes 
From our achievements, though performed at height, 
The pith and marrow of our attribute. 
So oft it chances in particular men, 
That for some vicious mole of nature in them, 
His virtues else, be they as pure as grace, 
31 Snell, pp. 109-12, 160, 182, 185; Eric A. Havelock, 
Preface to Plato (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1963), pp. 40-47, 197-214, 234-53, 303-04. Enduring fame is 
a sort of survival after death, and 
Dodds, p. 29, notes correctly that 11 in the Iliad heroism does 
not bring happiness; its sole and sufficient reward is fame. 11 
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As infinite as man may undergo, 
Shall in the general censure take corruption 
From that particular fault (1.4.17-36). 
For a woman of this traditional world of honor, chastity 
was the primary locus of honor, and for her to lose her purity 
was not only to lose her individual honor but that of her 
entire family as well. 32 
6c The insult is normally an oral event as we see 
Touchstone rehearse it in As You Like lt, or an oral event 
with a little manual emphasis, as in Hamlet's hypothesis: 
Who calls me villain: breaks my pate across? 
Plucks off my beard and blows it in my face: 
Tweaks me by the nose? ~ives me the lie in the throat 
As deep as to the lungs? 3 
And of course the "satisfaction" of an insult will be some 
form of revenge-- what Francis Bacon called "wild justice," 
what we might call vindictive justice. It might take the form 
of war, feuding, lynching, dueling, or suicide, depending on 
the cause and extent of the dishonor. 
Feuding survived in the Appalachian regions of this 
country into the present century and in the San Luis Valley of 
Colorado until just over a hundred years ago; Fr. Salvatore 
Persone gives this account from 1874: 
32 Watson, pp. 437-47. Self-control, control of one's well-
being, control of one's in-group, and control of the in-group's 
well-being are the four legs that honor stand upon. See Dover, p. 
204. 
33 As You Like lt, 5.4; Hamlet, 2.2. See also Gurevich, 
Historical Anthropology, p. 167, on early Scandinavian and Germanic 
abusive songs. 
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The enmities among the principal families were such that 
nobody dared to go twenty steps unarmed. Several times 
some people saved their lives by miracles. There was 
nobody who could rest secure in his own house, because 
through nocturnal attacks various persons had lost their 
lives in their own beds, and about four months before our 
arrival three men were found one fine mornin~ hanged from 
three different branches of the same tree. 3 
Lynching is a particularly wild (and often unjust) sub-species 
of wild justice, and it was a feature of the Old West -- such 
as Albuquerque in the 1870s and early 1880s. As recently as 
1891 Pope Leo XIII issued an encyclical letter against 
dueling, this one directed to the bishops of Germany and 
Austria and leveled at least partially against the student 
duels in the universities academically the leading 
universities of the world at that time. The final sort of 
revenge was that taken against oneself for the "insult" of 
failure -- Japanese hara-kiri was an example -- so as to 
retrieve honor. A sea-captain's going down with his ship was 
an honorable passive suicide. 35 
34 Salvatore Persone, S.J., letter in Lettere Edificanti 
della Provincia Napoletana 1 (1874-75), 5, translated in Marianne 
L. Stoller, et al., Diary of the Jesuit Residence of Our Lady of 
Guadalupe Parish. Conejos. Colorado. December 1871-December 1875 
(Colorado Springs: The Colorado College, 1982), p. 184; see also 
p. 11, diary entry for 1 February 1872, "The people [now] live in 
peace without being afraid of being attacked and killed." See also 
Lendon, pp. 41-42, 54, 247. 
35 Leo XIII, "Pastoralis Officii," 12 September 1891. In the 
humoral psychology of the Renaissance and earlier periods, the 
tendency of sorrow (the "cold dry tears" of melancholy) to become 
adust and turn into anger (hot and dry choler) would seem to give 
natural and divine warrant to revenge; Watson, p. 246, aptly quotes 
Malcolm to Macduff, Macbeth 4. 3. 228-30, on the point; Francis 
Bacon, "Of Revenge." 
See also Gurevich, Historical Anthropology, pp. 122-23, 135, 
142, and 145, and Kaster, p. 4. Watson, pp. 354-62, seems to wish 
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6d As suicide could restore honor when all else had failed, 
so proper burial rites and the surviving family members could 
maintain in this world the honor that an individual had won in 
life. 36 
Humanity existed for a long time before developing that 
ornament of literate civilization, the guilty conscience. As 
Bruno Snell puts it, "Happiness and ethics are found together 
in many ways, particularly so by the vexation which the memory 
of a wicked deed excites in the doer .... It is true that the 
guilty conscience was not known prior to Euripides; evidently 
it presupposes a high degree of introspection. 1137 
And even something that has been retained from the past 
can be transformed to some degree by the new consciousness 
which surrounds it; thus renaissance honor and shame, along 
with the rest of truly renaissance thinking, become very 
historically aware, and so we have Spenser and Shakespeare 
informing the ladies of their sonnets that of course they will 
survive forever in the immortal lines of the poem. These 
to approve actions of revenge that the plot-outcomes do not 
approve. The Christian doctrine, clearly stated by Christ in the 
Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5:43-48) and by Paul in Romans (12:19, 
quoting Deuteronomy 32:35; see also Hebrews 10:30), seems to me to 
be affirmed in every Elizabethan and Jacobean drama that touches 
the question: the revenger is never a good man, for though he may 
be "the scourge of God" in the subjective-genitive sense of the 
phrase, he in fact ignorantly or knowingly usurps God's prerogative 
of judging. 
36 Watson, pp. 141, 
Lendon, pp. 119-20. 
37 Snell, p. 163. 
252, 388-414; Dover, pp. 229, 261-67; 
25 
authors and their readers had a clear sense of fame's (and 
infamy's) ability to live in memory, keeping alive the memory 
of famous and infamous persons alike. 38 
Conclusion 
We have all suffered public manifestations of our lack or 
loss of control over ourselves or over the external world; we 
have all been embarrassed when persons with whom we have ties 
lose control in those ways; and we all know the fear of these 
things happening again. Therefore each one of us knows what 
shame is, so we know to some degree what honor is; and indeed 
the fundamental reality of honor is indeed control control 
of one's own destiny and control of the destiny of any ingroup 
for whom one is responsible. Most human beings know that such 
perfect control is more often than not an amiable illusion. 39 
We have all experienced both shame and honor, but our 
culture is characterized by literacy, historical awareness, 
urbanization and commercialization, democracy, individualism, 
and the ethical conscience. Hence we can retrieve only with 
38 Consider Christ's remark in Mark 14:9 about the sinful 
woman's washing his feet with ointment and drying them with her 
hair: "Wherever this gospel shall be preached in the whole world, 
what she has done will be told in memory of her." 
39 
"Masculine culture judged that a man's failure to act with 
proper courage and physical skill was, in effect, an admission that 
his wif of toher female family members could not be defended"; 
Lyman L. Johnson in Johnson and Lipsett-Rivera, pp. 130-31. We are 
well warned neither to make facile comparisons of group with group 
or era with era nor to assume that honor itself stays the same in 
societies that are different; see pp. 71-72, 153-54. 
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a great effort of vicarious imagination a complete sense of an 
older world to which not a single one of these six 
characteristics of our world was proper. In this earlier 
world, the honor code was the only glue which gave coherence 
to the whole human enterprise, for the honor code protected 
the private integrity of each person embedded in the 
community, safeguarding his or her entitlements as a member 
and serving as a restraint upon any encroachment. Since this 
six-ingredient social coherence, honor, was so pervasive and 
important, consolidating corporate human consciousness for 
several millennia in its own way (at times quiet and 
invisible, at other times noisy and showy), it richly rewards 
our closer examination. 
Peter Berger remarks, "The demise of honor has been a 
very costly price to pay for whatever liberations modern man 
may have achieved." But in the Navajo emergence story, one of 
the original creatures returns to a lower level to retrieve 
and bring along some pottery left behind; the pot is an 
emptiness, a womblike readiness, a symbol of past memory that 
makes meaning and freedom possible. 40 This existentially 
astute example should encourage us first to become fully aware 
of the shortcomings of the honor code in itself and encourage 
us next to integrate its many good features with loftier 
levels of moral reasoning, transforming the handsome 
40 Berger, p. 95; Sheila Moon, A Magic Dwells; A Poetic and 
Psychological Study of the Navajo Emnergence Myth (Middleton; 
Wesleyan Univeristy Press, 1970), pp. 24-33. 
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attainments of true gentility into precious ornaments of 
lawfulness, altruism, and religious self-sacrifice. 
28 
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